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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
lsaac James Cantrell appeals from his convictions for trafficking in
marijuana and DUI. Cantrell challenges the denial of his suppression motion,
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs
The state charged Cantrell with trafficking in marijuana and misdemeanor
driving under the influence (DUI). (R., pp. 25-26.) Cantrell filed a motion to
suppress all evidence resulting from his encounter with police and subsequent
arrest. (R., pp. 36-37.) The district court made the following findings of fact:
The defendant, lsaac Cantrell, was stopped at 2:22 a.m. on
January 28, 2008 driving the wrong way on 12" and Bannock
Streets in Boise, Idaho. Within about a minute, Officer Tony White
from the Boise STEP program, a specialized task force which
evaluates drivers who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
arrived and parked behind the defendant's car and the other patrol
car, both of which were pointing the wrong way on 12thStreet. .. .

The defendant failed to HGN test, his eyes were bloodshot
and glassy, he was driving the wrong way on a clearly marked oneway street, he admitted he had been drinking, he exhibited difficulty
in the divided attention tests, his speech was sometimes "thick," he
refused to continue field sobriety tests, he said he did not know
where he was coming from nor where he was traveling, under all
the circumstances, the officer was justified in placing the defendant
in custody for Driving Under the Influence.
It is the policy of the night STEP team to impound cars of
suspected DUI drivers unless the driver is only possibly close to the
legal limit. The policy was implemented because drunk drivers
often bond out, return to their cars and resume driving drunk. Local
businesses are not happy when cars are parked on their lots after
the drivers are arrested because the cars are sometimes left there
for several days. The department also has concerns about claims
being made about thefts from vehicles. The defendant's vehicle

was parked illegally in the street and was pointing the wrong way
so Officer White intended to have it impounded. In preparation for
the impounding of the vehicle pursuant to the defendant's arrest,
Officer White searched under the driver's seat and located a
Tupperware container with four sandwich baggies of marijuana in it.
The officer stopped, went to the patrol car and Mirandized the
defendant. ... He told the officer there was a bong in the trunk.
The officer opened the trunk and immediately smelled the strong
odor of marijuana. He opened a green duffle bag and found two
pounds of marijuana in the duffle bag.

(R.,pp. 87-90.) The district court denied the suppression motion, finding
probable cause for the stop, probable cause for the arrest on DUI, a proper
search of the passenger compartment of the car incident to arrest, a voluntary
waiver of Miranda rights, and a proper inventory search of the car.

(R.,pp. 90-

The case proceeded to jury trial, where Cantrell was convicted on both
counts.

(R.,pp. 97-1 14.) The district court sentenced Cantrell to one year fixed

on the trafficking count and probation for two years on the DUI.
Cantrell filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 135-38.)

(R.,pp. 130-34.)

ISSUES
Cantrell states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Cantrell's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Officers searched the passenger compartment of Cantrell's car incident to
1.
Cantrell's arrest for DUI. Has Cantrell failed to show either that the search was
improper or that he was entitled to exclusion of evidence found pursuant to the
search?
The district court also found the search of the entire car proper as an
2.
inventory search. Has Cantrell failed to show error in this finding?

ARGUMENT
I.
The Search Of The Passenger Compartment Did Not Violate Cantrell's Rights
Aaainst Unreasonable Searches
A.

Introduction
The district court applied the

m'rule and found that the search of the

passenger compartment of Cantrell's car was a proper search incident to arrest.
(R., pp. 92-93.) The

Belton

line of cases, however, has subsequently been

partially overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States. Arizona v. Gant,
129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009).

On appeal, Cantrell asserts that the search of the

passenger compartment of his car did not comply with the requirements of
(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-15.)

w.

This argument fails because the search was

proper under the rubric of W t , and further because the exclusionary rule does
not apply because the officer acted in good faith reliance on law as it existed at
the time of the search.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith,
141 Idaho 728,730,117 P.3d 142,144 (Ct. App. 2005).

' New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
4

C.

Officers Properlv Searched The Passenqer Compartment Of Cantrell's
Car Incident To His Arrest For DUI
In Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the Supreme Court of the

United States rejected the "bright line" rule of New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981), and adopted the following legal standard applicable to the search of a
passenger compartment incident to arrest: "Police may search a vehicle incident
to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe
the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." W t , 129 S.Ct. at 1723.
m
J
Although the district court decided this case before the @

opinion issued,

application of the new standard shows that the search of the passenger
compartment was reasonable under the second of these search justifications:
that it was reasonable to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the DUI.
Cantrell was arrested on probable cause of DUI. (Tr., p. 42, L. 19 - p. 43,
L. 6; see also R., p. 92 (district court's finding of probable cause to arrest for

DUI).) Officer White (the arresting officer) testified that the search of the car
incident to arrest is "part of' his ongoing investigation into the DUI, because "in
[his] experience" there is often evidence of alcohol or drug consumption "in close
proximity to the driver's seat or the driver's compartment." (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 6-21.)
Cantrell argues that "it would not be reasonable to search a vehicle for
evidence of DUI." (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) Cantrell's argument fails for two
reasons. First, it ignores the testimony of Officer White. Cantrell cannot show
error by merely ignoring evidence contrary to his position. The officer, who
specializes in DUI investigations (Tr., p. 20, L. 10

- p. 28,

L. Z), testified that

when investigating a DUI "it's been my experience we find a lot of [evidence of
alcohol or drug use] in close proximity to the driver's seat or the driver's
compartment" (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 13-21). Cantrell can point to no evidence in the
record that would indicate that it was unreasonable to believe the car would
contain evidence of DUI.
Second, Cantrell's argument simply makes no logical sense.

Cantrell

argues that the only evidence of DUI is evidence that he was over .08 BAC and
therefore no evidence could be found in the vehicle, and that the only "possible"
evidence of DUI would be an open container, and it is unreasonable to look for
such without evidence the suspect had been drinking in his car. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 14-15 (emphasis original).)

Cantrell's view of what is evidence and

what is reasonable is myopically narrow.
Cantrell's first argument -- that the only evidence police can hope to gain
in a DUI investigation is a BAC test

-- withstands no scrutiny.

A DUI trial does

not start and end with a breathalyzer report. Evidence of consumption of alcohol
or drugs would of course be evidence of DUI.
Cantrell's second argument is without merit. To the extent Cantrell is
arguing that an open container of alcohol in the car is not evidence of DUI
because it is a separate crime, Cantrell has cited no authority for such a novel
and counter-intuitive proposition. State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d
966, 970 (1996); State v. Li, 131 ldaho 126, 129, 952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App.
1998). Clearly partly or completely empty alcohol containers in the car would be
evidence of DUI.

So would receipts from bars or other indicia of recent

frequenting of a place where alcohol is served. Signs of recent urination or
vomiting in the vehicle would be potential evidence of DUI, as would the smell of
alcohol in the car or the presence of drugs or drug paraphernalia.
Likewise, Cantrell's argument that it was unreasonable to look for such
evidence in his case is without merit. Specifically, Cantrell asserts that "in the
absence of some additional evidence that the driver was consuming alcohol in
the vehicle" it would be unreasonable to look in the car for evidence of DUI.
(Appellant's brief, p. 14.) This argument ignores the analysis of

m. In Gant

the Court stated that "the offense of arresf will supply a basis for searching the
passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein,"
noting that it was reasonable to look for drugs in cases where the arrests were
for drug offenses.

w, 129 S.Ct.

at 1719 (emphasis added).

Cantrell's

suggestion that the officer must conduct an investigation of exactly where the
DUI driver consumed his alcohol and may then search only if the evidence shows
that he was drinking in his car is contrary to the analysis in

m. Here the

offense of arresf justified looking for evidence of that offense. As shown by the
evidence and the law, it was reasonable for the officer to look for signs of
consumption of drugs or alcohol in the vehicle.
D.

Even If The Search Had Been Improper Under Ganf Cantrell Was Not
Entitled To Suppression Under The Fourth Amendment
Even assuming that the search of the car was improper, however, Cantrell

would still not be entitled to suppression of evidence under the Fourth
Amendment.

Where, as here, the conduct of the officer was objectively

reasonable a defendant is not entitled to suppression even if there were a search
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the United States Supreme
Court addressed the question of whether suppression of evidence was
appropriate where the police had relied upon a facially valid warrant. The Court
iirst noted that its precedents did not require exclusion of evidence as a remedy
for all Fourth Amendment violations.

M,428

Leon,468 U.S. at 905-06, cifing Stone v.

U.S. 465 (1976). Nor is suppression a right guaranteed to the

individual, but is rather a judicially created remedy crafted for its deterrent effect.

&,

468 U.S. at 906, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348

(1974).
The Court further stated that exclusion of evidence is a remedy that exacts
"substantial social costs" as it impedes the truth finding processes of the judicial
system, which often results in the guilty going free or receiving reduced
sentences.

Leon,468 U.S. at 907.

When applied to actions of law enforcement

taken in good faith or where the violation was minor, "the magnitude of the
benefit conferred on such guilty defendants offends basic concepts of the
criminal justice system" and can generate disrespect for the law and the
administration of justice. &,

468 U.S. at 907-08. Thus, the exclusionary rule

should be applied only "'where its remedial objectives are thought most
efficaciously served."'

Leon,468 U.S. at 910, quofing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.

Assuming that the exclusionary rule ever has the desired effect of
discouraging misconduct, "it cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to

deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity."

Leon, 468

U.S. at 918-

19.
Application of the exclusionary rule "'necessarily assumes that the police
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right."' &,

468 U.S. at 919, quoting Michiqan

v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974). Once an officer has obtained a warrant,
there is nothing more the officer can do to comply with the law and, therefore,
"[plenalizing the officer for t h magistrate's error; rather than his own, cannot
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations." &,
468 U.S. at 921. Thus, the Court held, "the marginal or nonexistent benefits
produced by suppressing evidence obtained in objectively reasonable reliance on
a subsequently invalidated search warrant cannot justify the substantial costs of
exclusion."

m,468 U.S. at 922.

Exclusion of evidence from the execution of an invalid search warrant is
only appropriate where the magistrate was misled by information the affiant knew
was false or provided in reckless disregard for its truth; where the issuing
magistrate "wholly abandoned his judicial role"; where probable cause was so
lacking that "official belief in its existence [was] entirely unreasonable"; and
where the warrant was so facially deficient that the executing officers could not
reasonably presume that it was valid.

&,

468 U.S. at 922-23.

Leon's "good faith" analysis has been applied by the Court in other
contexts as well. in Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 4 (1995), Evans was arrested
on an outstanding warrant and his car searched incident to his arrest. It was

later learned that the arrest warrant had been quashed 17 days previously, but
the court failed to notify law enforcement, so the warrant still showed as valid in
computer records.

Id. at

4-5.

Concluding that the officer's conduct was

reasonable, and the error was committed by court employees who would not be
deterred from improper conduct by suppression of evidence, the Court concluded
that suppression was not warranted under the Fourth Amendment.

Id.at 14-16.

Recently the Court decided Herrina v. United States, - U.S. -,

129

S.Ct. 695, 698 (2009), in which Herring had been arrested on the basis of an
arrest warrant that appeared in computer records maintained by law enforcement
in a different county, but a search of the actual records after arrest showed the
warranf had been recalled. The Court held that suppression of evidence of illegal
possession of a controlled substance and a firearm was not required because the
police conduct did not rise to the level of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct, or ... recurring or systemic negligence."

Id. at

702.

Suppression is not called for, the Court held, when the police mistakes are the
result of simple negligence rather than systemic errors or reckless disregard of
constitutional requirements.

at 704.

In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342-44 (1987), a police officer inspected
the yard and records of a licensed dealer in automotive parts and scrap pursuant
to an Illinois statute allowing such searches, and ultimately arrested three people
for possession of stolen cars. The Illinois statute in question was struck down as
unconstitutional by a federal court the day after the search.
the reasoning of

Id.at 344.

Applying

Leon,the Court concluded that the error in that case was the

Illinois legislature's act of passing an unconstitutional statute, and that there
would be no deterrent effect to be gained by suppression.

Id. at 349-53.

The

Court held that the officer's reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable;
therefore the exclusionary rule did not apply.

Id.at 356-60.

The analysis of these cases applies in this one.

Officer White acted

entirely reasonably under the law as it existed at the time. As found by the
district court, Cantrell was stopped for driving the wrong way on a one-way street
and the police developed probable cause that he was driving under the influence
and arrested him. (R., pp. 87-93.) The legality of the search incident to arrest
was well established at that time. State v. Heer, 118 ldaho 98, 99, 794 P.2d
1154, 1155 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and
finding search of car incident to defendant's arrest for DUI constitutionally
reasonable). It was not unreasonable for Officer White to fail to anticipate that
that the Supreme Court of the United States would, approximately 15 months
later, alter the applicable legal standards.
Because Officer White's conduct was reasonable and in no way the
product of "deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or ... recurring or
systemic negligence," Herring, 129 S.Ct. at 702, the exclusionary rule of the
Fourth Amendment does not apply.

E.

The Exclusionarv Rule Should Not Apply In This Case Under The ldaho
Constitution
The search in this case was legal under the ldaho Constitution as it has

been so far interpreted by its courts. State v. Charpentier, 131 ldaho 649, 651,

962 P.2d 1033, 1035 (1998); State v. Heer, 118 ldaho 98, 99, 794 P.2d 1154,
1155 (Ct. App. 1990). No ldaho case has, as of the writing of this brief, adopted

Gant as the proper interpretation of the ldaho's constitutional search and seizure
provisions.
If this Court should, in this case or another pending case, adopt the Gant
analysis as controlling under Idaho's constitution, then, as explained above, the
search was still reasonable because it is reasonable to search a DUI arrestee's
car for evidence of DUI.
Finally, even if
unreasonable under

Gant

Gant,

were ldaho law, and even if the search were

application of ldaho's exclusionary rule would be

unreasonable. The state requests this Court to either adopt the exclusionary rule
of the Fourth Amendment as applicable under ldaho's constitution or, in the
alternative, to hold that exclusion would be improper under ldaho's standard on
the facts of this case.
1.

The Exclusionary Rule Under The ldaho constitution Should Be
Co-Extensive With The Exclusionarv Rule Of The Fourth
Amendment

The Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule was rejected by a
two justice plurality2 of the ldaho Supreme Court in State v. Guzman, 122 ldaho
981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992), overruling State v. Prestwich, 116 ldaho 959, 783
P.2d 298 (1989).

The state respectfully submits that Guzman should be

In State v. Josephson, 123 ldaho 790, 852 P.2d 1387 (1993), a unanimous
court applied Guzman, holding that it applied retroactively, to reverse a district
court's denial of suppression.

overruled, and the law as set forth in Prestwich reinstated. Precedence of the
ldaho Supreme Court can, and should, be overruled if it is manifestly wrong, has
proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or overruling it is necessary to vindicate
plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.

Houqhland

Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990). The
Guzman opinion should be overruled because a review of its reasoning shows it
to be manifestly wrong, and following persuasive reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court would result in clarity and uniformity of the law and better meet
the objectives of the exclusionary rule.
Writing for the court, Justice Bistline reasoned that ldaho had adopted the
exclusionary rule at a time when the United States Supreme Court had not made
the exclusionary rule mandatory upon the states, and that the exclusionary rule
ldaho adopted was more comprehensive than the federal rule. Because Idaho's
exclusionary rule was designed to protect broader interests than preventing
police overreaching, the purpose the Guzman plurality felt was the sole
underpinning of the exclusionary rule in &,

the Court reasoned that Idaho's

history of application of the exclusionary rule was inconsistent with allowing a
good faith exception. Guzman, 122 ldaho at 992-93, 842 P.2d at 671-72.
The reasoning of the Guzman plurality is flawed for two reasons. First, a
review of the ldaho cases upon which Justice Bistline relied does not support his
conclusions. To the contrary, those cases clearly show that Idaho's exclusionary
rule is co-extensive with the exclusionary rule as adopted and applied by the
United States Supreme Court.

Second, even assuming that the ldaho

exclusionary rule serves the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable
searches and seizures, deterring Fourth Amendment violation and protecting
judicial integrity, the good faith exception as articulated in

is consistent with

those purposes.
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality does not
support its analysis or results. For example, the court first relied upon State v.
Arrequi, 44 ldaho 43, 254 P. 788 (1927), the case adopting the exclusionary rule
for ldaho. However, the court in Arrecjui specifically relied upon United States
Supreme Court authority in adopting the exclusionary rule. Arrequi, 254 P. at
791. Furthermore, the court, quoting a passage from an Oklahoma court that it
"would not attempt to improve," went so far as to say that the "'guarantees of
immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures"' in the federal and state
constitutions "'are practically the same,"' and therefore "'it follows without
argument that the rule of evidence in the state courts, where like facts and
principles of law are involved, should conform to that settled by the court
having supreme prestige and authority."' Arrequi, 254 P. at 791 (emphasis

added), quoting Gore v. State, 218 P. 545, 547 (Ok. Cr. App. 1923). It is thus
clear that the ldaho Supreme Court did not adopt an exclusionary rule for the
ldaho Constitution different from that pronounced by the United States Supreme
Court for the Fourth Amendment.
Nor are the other cases relied upon in Guzman indicative that the ldaho
Supreme Court had ever adopted an exclusionary rule broader than that
articulated by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in State v. Rauch,

99 ldaho 586, 586 P.2d 671 (1978), the court suppressed for failure to comply
with the knock and announce statutes, relying heavily upon the "landmark case"
of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).

The only mention of the ldaho

Constitution occurs in the quote of a dissenting opinion.

m,99 ldaho at 593,

586 P.2d at 678, quoting State v. Anderson, 31 ldaho 514, 527, 174 P. 124, 129
(1918) (Morgan, J., dissenting).

There is nothing in the opinion that would

suggest that the exclusionary rule in ldaho is broader than its federal counterpart.
Likewise, in State v. LePaqe, 102 ldaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981), cerf.
den. 454 U.S. 1057 (1982). the court determined LePage's right to counsel had
been violated under both the federal and state constitutions. The part of the
opinion relied upon by the Guzman court for the proposition that judicial integrity
is a factor in exclusion is actually a quote from two United States Supreme Court
cases. In response to a claim that the issue had not been preserved by proper
objection below, the Court stated:
Finally, we are cognizant of the need to insure that the
judiciary does function, and is perceived as functioning, in a
manner consistent with the individual constitutional rights, both
state and federal, of all who appear before the bar of justice.
While the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is undoubtedly
to deter police misconduct, it is also true that at some point the
courts must simply refuse to countenance certain behavior on the
part of law enforcement agencies. "Courts . . . cannot and will
not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of
citizens by permitting unhindered use of the fruits of such
invasions." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 20
L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). While "the imperative of judicial integrity"
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1446, 4
L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960), may not be the primary reason for refusing to
allow the use of unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, it
certainly requires us to exercise our discretion to review alleged
errors that affect substantial rights and are "plain" in the sense that

it is evident that a mistake has occurred. Accordingly, we turn to an
examination of the merits of LePage's claim.
L e P a ~ e102
, ldaho at 391-92, 630 P.2d at 678-79 (emphasis added).
Thus, the part of the LePaqe opinion relied upon for the claim that ldaho's
exclusionary rule is broader than the federal one, and therefore cannot recognize
a good faith exception, actually states quite the opposite. The court specifically
referenced both federal and state rights, drawing no distinction between them.
The court also stated that the primary purpose of the rule is deterring police
conduct, and the secondary reasoning is that the courts cannot be made a party
to "certain behavior on the part of law enforcement agencies." This purpose is
entirely consistent with a good faith exception as articulated in &.

Finally, the

Court does not rely upon ldaho authority for this proposition, but rather authority
of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, nothing in the L e P a ~ edecision
indicates that the ldaho Supreme Court was adopting or articulating any rule
different from its federal counterpart or inconsistent with the

& good faith

exception.
A review of the authority relied upon by the Guzman plurality shows that
there is nothing in those cases indicating that ldaho's exclusionary rule is any
different than its federal counterpart. To the contrary, those cases show that the
ldaho Supreme Court has consistently looked to the decisions of the United
States Supreme Court in both adopting and defining the exclusionary rule in
ldaho law. Because Guzman misinterpreted and misapplied ldaho law, it should
be overruled, and the ldaho exclusionary rule be interpreted as coextensive with

exclusion as required by the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth
Amendment.
The second flaw of Guzman is its contention that the

Leon

good faith

exception to the exclusionary rule is inimical to the values of exclusion unrelated
to police deterrence.

The plurality contended that Idaho's exclusionary rule

served the purposes of providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and
seizures, deterring police misconduct, encouraging thoroughness in the warrant
application process, preventing an "additional constitutional violation" by allowing
consideration of the evidence, and preserving judicial integrity. Guzman, 122
Idaho at 993842 P.2d at 672. The United States Supreme Court persuasively
addressed these concerns, explaining why they do not require suppression of
evidence where the police have acted objectively reasonably.

Leon Court did not, as implied in Guzman, reject remedial or other
concerns in the exclusionary rule. Leon,468 U.S. at 905-13. The Court started
The

its analysis of exclusion as a remedy by specifically noting that exclusion is a
court-created - not a constitutionally mandated - remedy.

Leon,468

U.S. at

905-06. This remedy is sensitive to the costs it extracts, and is to be restricted to
those areas "'where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served."'

m, 468

U.S. at 906-08, quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348.

Indiscriminate application of the exclusionary rule, because of those costs, tends
to generate, not prevent, disrespect for the law and the administration of justice.

Leon,468 U.S. at 908.

Thus, the Court had previously found limitations on the

exclusionary rule related to federal habeas corpus; grand jury proceedings; civil

trials; where a particular defendant had no standing; in using the evidence for
rebuttal; and refusing to adopt a "but for" standard for suppression.

Leon,468

U.S. at 909-1 1. A rule that does not require suppression of evidence where the

police have acted objectively reasonably in obtaining and executing a warrant is
thus consistent with the limited remedial and other purposes of the exclusionary
rule.

The ldaho courts have adopted the same limitations on Idaho's

exclusionary rule, implicitly recognizing the same balancing of the rule's costs
against its benefits.
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter overzealous law
enforcement officers from violating the rights of suspects. LePaqe, 102 ldaho at
391, 630 P.2d at 678.

The

Leon

Court addressed other purposes for the

exclusionary rule and found them inadequate to justify excluding evidence
obtained by a police officer whose conduct was objectively reasonable in
obtaining and executing a search warrant.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 921 n.22, 922.

This authority and reasoning is persuasive, and should guide the ldaho courts in
application of the exclusionary rule under the ldaho Constitution
2.

Suppression Of Evidence Would Be Improper Under Idaho's
Exclusionan, Rule

Even under the exclusionary rule of Guzman suppression is unwarranted
in this case. As noted above, the ldaho exclusionary rule serves the purposes of
providing a remedy for unreasonable searches and seizures, deterring police
misconduct, encouraging thoroughness in the warrant application process,
preventing an "additional constitutional violation" by allowing consideration of the

evidence, and preserving judicial integrity. Guzman, 122 ldaho at 993, 842 P.2d
at 672. None of these goals is served by suppression in this case.
First, suppression in this case does not provide a remedy for
unreasonable searches and seizures.

At the time Officer White searched

Cantrell's car the search was reasonable under existing legal authority. State v.

&,

118 ldaho 98, 99, 794 P.2d 1154, 1155 (Ct. App. 1990). Applying the

exclusionary rule would provide a "remedy" for conduct that was legal and
reasonable at the time it occurred and could be deemed unreasonable only by
applying law that did not exist until about 15 months after the search occurred.
Such application would be a windfall rather than a remedy.
Second, as mentioned above, application of the exclusionary rule in this
case cannot conceivably provide any deterrent. Neither police nor anyone else
will be deterred from disobeying the strictures of Gant by suppressing the fruit of
searches conducted before Gant was even decided.
Third, exclusion will not encourage thoroughness in the warrant
application process because there was no warrant.

Nor will suppression

encourage thoroughness in the decision to search a car incident to arrest
because officers will certainly be required to follow Gant now that that case has
been decided.
Fourth, there would be no "additional constitutional violation" by use of the
evidence. Idaho's constitution contains no express or implied constitutional right
to prevent the prosecution from using evidence seized pursuant to a search that
was legal under the law and precedents existing at the time of the search.

Finally, application of the exclusionary rule would not preserve judicial
integrity. Quite the opposite would occur by applying the exclusionary rule in the
context of this case.

As noted by the Supreme Court, application of the

exclusionary rule imposes substantial societal costs in allowing the guilty to go
free.

Leon, 468

U.S. at 907. To mandate those costs without any benefit does

not preserve judicial integrity. Likewise, to punish society because an officer
failed to anticipate a change in the law that governed his conduct is not an act of
integrity, but an act without reason.
In this case the search was reasonable under the law at the time it was
conducted. To date, the search is still reasonable under applicable authority
interpreting the Idaho Constitution. If the law is to be changed to retroactively
render the search unreasonable, then the exclusionary rule does not apply
because suppression of evidence of a search that was lawful when conducted
would not meet any underlying rationale for the exclusionary rule.

11.
The Search Was A Proper lnventorv Search
A.

Introduction
The district court determined that the search of the car was also justified

as an inventory search pursuant to its impoundment. (R., p. 95.) Cantrell first
argues that the court erred by excluding evidence where other cars were not
impounded, which Cantrell claims was relevant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) This
argument is frivolous because the court excluded the evidence based upon lack
of foundation because the witness had no personal knowledge of what happened

in those alleged instances - whether the evidence was relevant was immaterial
to the court's ruling. Cantrell next argues that the impoundment of his car was
illegal because Cantrell had passengers in the car. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-19.)
Cantrell's argument that the officer was required to hand over the keys to
someone who did not own the car and had no permission of the owner to
possess the car is also frivolous. Cantrell finally argues that the search was
improper because the evidence did not establish an inventory policy regarding
whether to open containers.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 19-23.)

This argument,

however, was not preserved because Cantrell argued below that the search was
invalid and never asserted below that the search exceeded the scope of an
allowable inventory search. Thus, Cantrell has failed to show error in the district
court's holding that the search was a proper inventory search.
B.

Standard Of Review
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith,
141 Idaho 728, 730,117 P.3d 142,144 (Ct. App. 2005).
C.

Cantrell's Claim Of Error In The Introduction Of Evidence Is Frivolous
During the hearing on the suppression motion Officer White testified that

the STEP officers generally impounded vehicles after a DUI arrest, within certain
"guidelines." (Tr., p. 444, L. 19 - p. 46, L. 8.) One of those guidelines was that

sometimes vehicles were not impounded if the suspected BAC was close to the
legal limit. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 8-19.) One reason for this guideline is to prevent the
DUI arrestee from returning after bonding out and driving the car while still under
the influence. (Tr., p. 46, L. 20 - p. 47, L. 9.)
In cross-examination counsel for Cantrell asked, "Isn't it true that persons
with blood alcohol levels in the .16, . I 7 and, in fact, as high as .2 within the last
six months to a year have commonly not been towed?" (Tr., p. 76, Ls. 6-9.)
Officer White answered, "Not by me." (Tr., p. 76, L. 10.) In response to further
questioning Officer White stated that he did not know if other officers had failed to
tow vehicles under circumstances that met the criteria for towing the car of a
driver arrested for DUE. (Tr., p. 76, Ls. 11 - 19.) When counsel tried to impeach
the officer with four police reports he claimed represented instances where
officers did not tow despite a high BAC, the court held that such was improper
because the officer lacked personal knowledge of the purported incidents. (Tr.,
p.76, L.21 - ~ . 7 8 , L . I . )
On appeal Cantrell argues the district court erred because the evidence
was relevant. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-9.) Because the basis for the court's ruling
is quite plainly lack of personal knowledge and the exclusion of evidence was
under the standards stated in I.R.E. 602, Cantrell's appellate argument that the
evidence should not have been excluded under I.R.E. 401 is frivolous.

D.

Cantreil Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Holding That
The Car Was Properlv Impounded
Officer White ordered Cantrell's vehicle impounded because he suspected

Cantreil had a high BAC and because his car was parked illegally. (Tr., p. 44, L.
19 - p. 48, L. 5.) Cantrell argues that the impoundment was illegal because
applicable policy did not require impoundment of all vehicles upon a DUI arrest
and because the officer failed to inquire "as to the availability any [sic] of the
passengers to take possession of the vehicle."

(Appellant's brief, p. 19.)

Cantrell's argument fails because he has failed to provide any authority for the
proposition that an impounding officer must affirmatively try to find someone to
take possession of the vehicle.
Cantrell's argument that the policy for impounding is unconstitutional
because it leaves some discretion up to the officer is without legal merit. An
impoundment policy can validly leave discretion to an officer on the decision
whether to impound, so long as that discretion is exercised for reasons unrelated
to whether the officer believes he will find evidence. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,
3-4 (1990). Here the discretion exercised by officers is based on judgment of
whether the arrestee would be sufficiently sober to drive upon bonding out, not
whether the officer believes evidence could be found in the car.

Cantrell's

argument that the policy is illegal for vesting some discretion in officers is without
merit.
Cantrell's second argument

-

that the officer was required to inquire

whether one of Cantrell's passengers could take possession of the car - is
without any legal support whatsoever. At best Cantrell's authority stands for the

proposition that when the owner of the vehicle is a passenger it is generally
unreasonable to impound upon arresting the driver. State v. Weaver, 127 ldaho
288, 900 P.2d 196 (1995) (cited at Appellant's brief, pp. 17-18). This argument is
therefore not properly submitted for appellate consideration. State v. Zichko, 129
ldaho 259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (arguments unsupported by citation to
legal authority will not be considered on appeal); State v. Li, 131 ldaho 126, 129,
952 P.2d 1262, 1265 (Ct. App. 1998) (same).

E.

Cantrell May Not Challenqe The Scope Of The Search For The First Time
On Appeal
Only those issues either argued to or decided by the trial court may be

raised on appeal. State v. DuValt, 131 ldaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644
(1998). Cantrell contends for the first time on appeal that Officer White exceeded
the proper scope of an inventory search because there is no evidence about the
policy defining the scope of an inventory search. (R., pp. 19-23.) The record in
this case shows that whether the inventory policy addressed opening containers
was an issue never raised to the trial court. On the contrary, the only issue
raised to the trial court was whether the impoundment of the car itself was done
pursuant to a valid impoundment policy. Because the issue of whether police
exceeded the scope of the search was not raised below (the parties only raising
and addressing the issue of whether a search was at all allowed because the
impoundment was illegal), Cantrell's improper attempt to raise it on appeal
should be rejected.

Cantrell submitted a memorandum in support of his motion to suppress.
(Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress and Request for Leave to File
Supplemental

Briefing

and

to

Extend

Time

for

Hearing

(hereinafter

"Memorandum"), exhibits to R.) In that Memorandum Cantrell asserted that he
was entitled to suppression because his arrest was illegal because it was not
supported by probable cause (Memorandum, at pp. 3-8) and because his
Miranda rights waiver was involuntary (Memorandum, pp. 8-11).

The state

responded, arguing that the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion;
there was reasonable suspicion to conduct the DUI investigation after the stop;
the arrest was supported by probable cause of DUI; the search of the passenger
compartment of the car was a proper search incident to arrest; the search of the
trunk of the car was supported by probable cause and therefore reasonable
under the automobile exception; and that the Miranda rights waiver was valid.

(R., pp. 44-70.) The state mentioned the propriety of impounding the vehicle.
(R., pp. 62-63.)

At the hearing the issue of impounding the car was raised, with Cantrell
arguing that the impoundment of the car was not done under a sufficiently
specific policy because it did not require impoundment in every identical
circumstance (Tr., p. 102, Ls. 11-16) and the state arguing that the impoundment
was correct "as I indicated in my brief' (Tr., p. 112, Ls. 7-19).
The reason that there is no evidence of what is the scope of an inventory
search upon impoundment is because that issue was never raised. It would be
inappropriate to fault the state for not presenting evidence on an issue never

raised. It would also be improper to reverse the district court on a question it was
never asked to decide. Because the issue of the scope of the inventory search
and whether the policy allowed opening of container was never raised below,
Cantrell is not entitled to have it reviewed for the first time on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order
denying to motion for suppression of evidence.
DATED this 28th day of July 2009.
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